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  “It is an interesting idea, Minister Velayati,” Whiting said.

  Across from her, the President shrugged; the President’s r grimaced. “We must present your idea to the President and the Congress; we should like to see a formal draft of such a treaty.

  Until then, Minister, the right of any nation to freely navigate international waters should not be infringed.”

  “The Persian Gulf is vital to Iran’s economy as well as the economies of the GCC and the industry of our customers, madam,” Velayati went on, continuing his single-minded preaching.

  “Because it is so vital, we propose that the Persian Gulf be completely demilitarized. Foreign warships, foreign warplanes, foreign troops should all leave. Iran pledges to do all that is possible to see to it that peace reigns in the Gulf. Can you pledge your support for this ideal, Madam Vice President? Will you take this message to the President?”

  “Minister Velayati, I will discuss everything with the President, of course,” Whiting said, “but we need to discuss the attack on the civilian Naval Reserve Fleet vessel, the issue of thirteen persons still missing from that attack, our rights to conduct salvage-and-rescue operations in the area, and Iran’s intentions should the United States or any other nation choose to send any vessel, including armed vessels, through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf.”

  “Madame Vice President, Iran feels that the presence of any offensive warships in the Persian Gulf will only increase tensions further,” Velayati said. “Iran strongly objects especially to the United States or any other nation sending any warships capable of land attack operations into the Gulf. You desire negotiations, yes, but Iran feels that such negotiations with Hornet bombers and Tomahawk cruise missiles aimed at our cities and military bases is not true negotiating—it is bargaining at gunpoint, and we shall not stand for such. If you truly desire peace, madam, if America truly does not want this conflict to escalate further, you will agree to remove your warships from the Gulf immediately. We shall do the same. Iran will not look favorably upon any nation that decides to send a warship capable of land attack into the Persian Gulf.”

  “Minister Velayati, your terms are much too broad for diplomatic discussion,” Vice President Whiting said in complete disbelief.

  “You simply cannot unilaterally decide to close the Persian Gulf to any vessels you choose, any more than the United States can close off the Gulf of Mexico or the Gulf of Alaska …”

  “We will not accept any interference from America!” Velayati emphasized. “If America attempts to sail an offensive land-attack warship into the Persian Gulf, Iran will consider it a hostile act. We do not wish war, but we are prepared to defend our rights and our freedoms! America wants another Desert Storm with Iran!

  No more Desert Storms! No more warships in the Persian Gulf! No more war!” And the line went dead.

  Whiting dropped the phone back in its cradle, then sat back in the couch in the Oval Office, where she had taken the call. “I’m too young and innocent for this, Mr. President,” she quipped. That was an exaggeration, of course.

  As the former Governor of Delaware and a former United Nations Deputy Ambassador, Whiting was well equipped to take on anyone in an argument …”

  “Hell, Ellen, Velayati was educated at Oxford—he’s supposed to respect women,” President Kevin Martindale said, trying to help his Vice President unclench her jaw. “I thought he was a pussycat.” Whiting was not going to relax that easily—her lips were tight, her eyes narrow and hard as she made her way back to her seat around the coffee table in the Oval Office.

  “Okay, ladies and gents, what in hell is going wrong around here?”

  the President asked. Recently elected and only forty-nine years old, divorced, with two grown children, he was in tremendously good health and vitality although the stress of forming a new government was bound to take its toll on his boyish good looks.

  Today he was dressed in gray slacks, business shoes, and a conservative white shirt under a thick cardigan sweater. His thick salt-and-pepper gray hair was neatly in place except for the famous “photographer’s dream,” a thick lock of bright silver hair that curled defiantly down across his forehead over his left eye when he got angry. The end of the lock was pointed, like the Grim Reaper’s scythe. If a second one appeared over the right eye, heads would roll.

  With the President and the Vice President was Secretary of State Jeffrey Hartman; Secretary of Defense Arthur Chastain; Philip Freeman, the President’s National Security Advisor; and Charles Ricardo, the White House Communications Director. “This is a new one on me,” the President went on. “Iran wants to close off the Persian Gulf to all land-attack warships. The request is so far out in left field that it’s laughable, but I got a feeling no one’s going to be laughing. First off, I want to hear about that incident with the spy ship. Phil, Arthur, Jeffrey, Charles, let’s hear it. Ellen, jump in anywhere. Let’s go.”

  “A covert-action vessel belonging to a technical group of the Intelligence Support Agency, code-named Madcap Magician, was attacked and destroyed by Iranian air bombardment,” Philip Freeman began. Freeman was the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the previous administration; his popularity and leadership had made him a possible presidential candidate after his retirement, but he had accepted the position of National Security Advisor in the new Martindale administration instead. It had turned out to be a good choice; he was very well respected, not only in the White House but in Congress and throughout the nation as well, on a par with Martindale himself.

  “Casualties?”

  “No definite word yet, sir,” Freeman responded. “The ship carried a crew of one hundred thirty-three. One hundred twenty persons were rescued from the United Arab Emirates; they escaped in four lifeboats before and during the attack. The rest are presumed missing or captured by the Iranian navy. The ship was lost, sunk by aerial missile bombardment.”

  “Was it on a spy mission?”

  “Very definitely,” Freeman said. “Operating under Executive Order 96-119, covert surveillance of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian heavy warship surveillance and intelligence. The vessel was the base for an unmanned stealth drone the National Security Agency began using to photograph the Iranian warships in the Gulf of Oman.”

  “Shit,” the President muttered. “Sounds like we lost a real valuable asset.”

  “The vessel had been used as a seagoing platform for tilt-rotor aircraft and Swimmer Delivery Vehicles,” Freeman said. “In service for about seven years, just before Desert Storm. The unit had also assisted on the GCC attack on Abu Musa Island recently—they inserted special-ops troops with laser designators to help the Arab crews hit their targets. Yes, we’ll miss that platform.”

  “We never should have sent it in the first place,” Secretary of State Hartman said. Hartman was the administration’s senior member, a former Wall Street investment House CEO and twelve-term Congressman from New York who brought an insider’s knowledge both of Congress and the world of international finance to a rather young White House. Hartman had also brought an extensive web of personal contacts with him—decision makers who preferred the old-boy network over diplomatic or political bureaucracy. “The GCC had no business attacking that island, and we had no business assisting them.”

  “Intelligence reports said that the Iranians were gearing up to launch an attack on the Abraham Lincoln carrier group when it entered the Persian Gulf,” Freeman responded. “The Iranians stole those islands from the United Arab Emirates and started basing antiship, antiaircraft, and long-range ballistic missiles there.”

  “‘Intelligence reports’ have been saying that same thing for years now,” Hartman said. “And Iran didn’t ‘steal’ those islands—they once owned them. The ownership is in dispute, that’s all, and negotiations with the United Arab Emirates were ongoing.”

  “Iran’s not negotiating any longer,” Freeman said. “It looks like the Iranians are going to block the Strait of Hormuz with their
aircraft carrier battle group.”

  “They’re going to park their what?” Vice President Whiting asked in complete surprise.

  “You heard correctly, Ms. Vice President,” Freeman said. “The Khomeini, Iran’s new aircraft carrier, has put to sea. A fourteen-ship battle group, including two of their three Kilo-class submarines.”

  “Iran has an aircraft carrier? Since when?” Whiting exclaimed.

  “Since 1995 at least,” Freeman responded, and related the details of its transformation from the ex-Russian carrier Varyag.

  “This is unbelievable!” Whiting said. “And now they’re going to park that thing in the middle of the Strait of Hormuz to block anyone else from entering the Persian Gulf?”

  “General, better give us a quick rundown on that battle group;” the President said.

  “Yes, sir,” Freeman said. He referred to his notes only briefly; he had received many detailed briefings on the Iranian military’s recent developments and knew the information, updated daily, almost by heart: “The Khomeini aircraft carrier battle group is the largest and most powerful seagoing battle group in southwest Asia, with the exception of our own—and in normal day-to-day postures, we’re certainly outnumbered, if not outgunned. Most of the ships are ex-U.S. or ex-British frigates and destroyers, but new hardware was acquired over the past three years during the Russians’ big arms fire sales, and with arms deals with China.

  “Leading the group is the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Although the Iranians call it a ‘defensive aviation cruiser,’ it’s a pure aircraft carrier, designed for high-performance fixed-wing aircraft, not just vertical-takeoff jets or helicopters. It carries an air group of twenty-four fixed-wing and fifteen rotary-wing aircraft, including two squadrons of twelve Sukhoi-33 Flanker-D fighter-bombers; it can carry probably another six to ten planes above-deck, including carrier-modified Sukhoi-25 bombers and MiG-29 fighters. The ship and the planes are top-of-the-line Russian hardware and weapons—the Iranians spent four billion dollars in the past five years outfitting this ship.

  “The Khomeini carries lots of anti-ship and antiaircraft weapons as well,” Freeman continued. “The Varyag was originally designed to carry nuclear anti-surface cruise missiles; we don’t think the Khomeini has any nukes, but it certainly has cruise missiles, probably ex-Russian SSN-12 Sandbox, good against ships or shore targets. The Sukhoi-33 fighter-bomber carries the Kh-41 Mosicit short-range and AS-18 Kazoo long-range ground-and maritime-attack missiles, along with air-to-air missiles. The Varyag was primarily designed as an anti-submarine warfare vessel, and so the Khomeini still has a pretty good ASW capability.”

  “It’s a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime agreement to sell sophisticated missile stuff to Iran,” Hartman pointed out. “Russia and China both signed that agreement.”

  “But Iran didn’t officially get them from Russia—they got the missiles from Ukraine, Serbia, and the Czech Republic, as well as North Korea. None of these countries signed the MTCR agreement—none of these countries except North Korea even existed in 1989, and North Korea thumbs its nose at the rest of the world all the time,” Freeman said. “The bottom line is this: Iran can get its hands on any military hardware it wants, and there’s little we can do about it. If we sanctioned every country that sold Iran modern military hardware, we’d alienate three-quarters of our trading partners.

  “The Iranian carrier group also includes the Chinese destroyer Zhanjiang, a very capable guided-missile destroyer,” Freeman went on. “This is supposedly being used to House Chinese officers who are also training on the Khomeini, but the destroyer was involved in shooting down the spy plane, so it’s obviously responding to orders from the Iranian commanders. The Iranians did buy one conventional Russian cruiser, which they call the Sadaf, both it and the Zhanjiang carry a big payload of surface, air, and anti-submarine weapons, but its primary purpose is carrier air defense. The group has two ex-U.S. Knox-class frigates to help out with antisubmarine defense, left over from our arms deals with the Shah, armed with Soviet- and Chinese-made missiles and electronics plus four ex-British frigates and four ex-Chinese Houku-class fast guided-missile patrol boats for outer-area screening; these boats carry Chinese-made antiship cruise missiles. The group includes a whole bunch of support vessels.”

  “Thanks to our ‘friends’ in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Iranians have lots of U.S.-made ships and equipment,” the Vice President said acidly.

  “I wouldn’t be surprised to see Iran start flying F-16 fighters soon,” Secretary of Defense Chastain interjected.

  “That’s not a joke, sir,” Freeman observed. “We believe Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, as well as China are supplying Iran with advanced Western hardware. It comes down to simple economics: few countries can afford to turn down the money Iran is paying for arms and advanced technology.”

  “Are they a threat to the Lincoln carrier group?” the President asked.

  “By itself, they can’t stand up against a carrier battle group like the Lincoln, sir,” Chastain chimed in. Chastain, a four-term U.S. Senator and nationally recognized military affairs expert, was well suited for his post in the Pentagon; unlike many political appointees, he knew the U.S. military as well as he knew Congress, and he had made himself familiar over the years with modern warfare and strategic thinking. “However, they would most likely operate well within range of land-based air forces and it could call upon another one hundred small attack craft to harass our group. I feel certain we could destroy most of iran’s air force and navy in a matter of days. Shadowing the Lincoln would just highlight how small the Khomeini is next to our ships—you can set the Khomeini on Lincoln’s deck with plenty of room to spare.” Chastain’s smile flickered, then faded as he asked: “What about that third Kilo sub, General? Is it in dry dock as last reported?”

  “We haven’t located the Iranian Kilo submarine—we thought it was in dry dock at the new sub base at Chah Bahar, but it disappeared,” Freeman acknowledged. He turned to the President: “The Kilo-class subs are diesel subs, no anechoic—anti-sound—coating on their hull, but still much quieter than nuclear-powered subs because they run on batteries while submerged. They can’t stay under as long, but when they’re under they’re hard to find and track, especially in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.”

  “They could cause a hell of a lot of destruction with two subs and an aircraft carrier, no matter how much firepower we bring against them,” the Vice President added. The Oval Office fell silent once again; even Chastain, an ardent Navy supporter, couldn’t argue with that. “I think it’s unlikely we’ll get into a carrier war with Hartman added, “but it’s a major concern. An American carrier hasn’t been sunk in combat since the battle of Midway—it would be a tremendous boost to Iranian morale if they did it, even if they eventually lost the war.

  “We’re going to see that scenario doesn’t happen,” the President said resolutely. “I don’t like the idea of Iran threatening us or barring us from navigating the open seas, but the Lincoln group could be a major target. I’m not prepared to send them in harm’s way until we’re ready to go all out and defend them with everything we’ve got.

  “Arthur, keep the Lincoln group in the Arabian Sea for now until we find out more.” The Secretary of Defense reluctantly nodded in agreement. To the National Security Advisor, the President asked, “Phil, any speculation on what Iran might do if they start a shooting war?”

  “The new Iranian military doctrine is simple: ensure Muslim world security and demonstrate its leadership by strict control of the skies and seas over and near its borders,” Freeman said.

  “Well-armed internal security forces like the Pasdaran hunt down insurgents and rebels and control the border; this leaves the regular military forces free to roam all of southwest Asia. The regular military’s primary emphasis is on three areas: the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; by far, the most important of these areas is the Strait of Hormuz—it’s the c
hoke point in the sea lanes to and from the Persian Gulf.

  “The conventional theory says that if Iran is provoked, they’ll cut off the Strait of Hormuz by application of massive shore-based anti-ship missile attacks, backed up by air-to-surface missile attacks using large numbers of supersonic aircraft, including heavy bombers, and by small, fast attack boats carrying anti-ship missiles or guns,” Freeman went on. “The missile sites would be defended with heavy concentrations of ground, sea, and airborne air defense forces that they’ve built up in tremendous numbers over the past few years. Without the application of concentrated suppression attacks, the Strait of Hormuz would become an impenetrable gauntlet. If successful, Iran could cut off nearly half of the region’s oil exports.”

  “Ha4(the Persian Gulf oil?”

  “Exactly,” Freeman acknowledged. “And the threat doesn’t stop there. With a few massive air raids, Iran can cut the Gulf pipelines flowing out of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE—there goes another twenty-five percent of the region’s oil. With their new long-range Backfire supersonic bombers, they might be able to cut the transArabian pipelines running west to the Red Sea—there goes another ten to fifteen percent. The rest—flowing from Iran itself—would presumably be cut by us. If successful, Iran could cut the entire world’s oil supply by thirty percent, all by itself, in a very, very short, lightning-fast blitzkrieg.”

  “No oil from the Middle East,” Hartman murmured aloud. “One-third of the world’s oil supply … almost half of America’s oil supply.

  It would be a catastrophe, Mr. President,” “And we couldn’t stop it from happening,” Chastain said. “I can say, as we stand right now, that it would take far longer than six months to amass a force equivalent to the one mobilized in Desert Shield, and it would be far more dangerous to U.S. forces. Even if the Iranians made the same mistake as Iraq did and let us accumulate our forces in Saudi, it would take us almost a year to build up a seven-hundred-fifty-thousand-man fighting force.”